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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-VoIR DIRE-PROSECUTORS MUST
Now SHOW THAT A JUROR IS IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED To VOT-
ING AGAINST THE MAXIMUM PENALTY BEFORE STRIKING FOR
CAUSE. Haynes v. Stale, 270 Ark. 685, 606 S.W.2d 563 (1980).
William E. (Pete) Haynes was charged with battery in the first
degree' and aggravated assault with a firearm 2 for an incident which
allegedly occurred on the evening of January 1, 1979. At the begin-
ning of voir dire, the St. Francis County prosecutor made it clear to
the panel of prospective jurors that he intended to seek the maxi-
mum penalty of forty years.3 During voir dire the prosecutor struck
for cause two veniremen who indicated that they would be unable to
sentence a person convicted of assault and battery to forty years in
prison regardless of the facts and circumstances incident to the com-
mission of the crime.4
I. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1601 (1977).
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604 (1977).
3. The prosecutor made the following statement to the prospective jurors:
Now what this all amounts to is that if the State proves the allegations of the infor-
mation in its entirety, the maximum punishment that can be imposed will be an-
other twenty years ... for battery and fifteen plus five will be another twenty years
... for aggravated assault, and ladies and gentlemen, that is serious and it is a
very severe punishment, but I want to tell you right here and right now up front
that that is what the State's going to be asking you to do, and that is put Pete
Haynes in the Arkansas Department of Correction for forty years.
Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 688-89, 606 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1980).
4. The questioning of Ms. Collins, one of the excused veniremen, was as follows:
Prosecutor: As you sit there now, before you heard the facts, you feel regardless,
that 40 years is just too much?
Ms. Collins: Well, yes, I do feel that way.
Prosecutor: . . . What I am asking and telling you is that I think the judge will
instruct you that this man can receive up to forty years, and I understand that some
of you-You may just feel like in any circumstances, regardless, that's too long. I
am asking: As you sit there right now, are you thinking, regardless of what the
State proves, that is just too long. I wouldn't impose that much. Maybe I could
impose twenty but I just couldn't impose forty regardless of the facts. Is that the
way you feel about it?
Ms. Collins: Well, I would have to hear the other side first.
Prosecutor: Well, that's not the way I'm asking. What I'm asking, Mrs. Collins-
Ms. Collins: I would try to be fair.
Prosecutor: . . . I know that, but here's the way I'm asking it to you. I'm asking:
As you sit there right now, do you feel that for a battery and assault, that to put a
man in the penitentiary for forty years is just too long regardless?
Ms. Collins: Well, yes, I do feel that way.
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Haynes was convicted of the crimes as charged and the jury
assessed his punishment at twenty years on the first degree battery
charge and ten years on the aggravated assault with - a firearm
charge.' On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court Haynes urged
four grounds for reversal, 6 one of which was that the court erred in
excluding veniremen who expressed reservations about assessing the
combined maximum sentence for the offenses charged.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case'
holding that the most the state may require of a juror is that he be
willing to consider all of the penalties provided by law and that he
not be irrevocably committed to voting against the maximum pen-
alty. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 606 S.W.2d 563 (1980).
Historically, the English common law has never permitted the
voir dire examination of jurors as it is practiced in the United
States. 9 In England the rule has always been that such examination
may be conducted only after a challenge for cause has been inter-
posed and then only in support of the challenge. 'I It has been said
The questioning of Mr. Banks, the other excused venireman, was as follows:
Prosecutor: . ..[T]he question I want to pose to you is this: Assume that after the
evidence is in that you believe the State had proved the man's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as we are required to do on both offenses. . . and at that point, the
maximum possible punishment would be forty years upon the Defendant in the
Department of Corrections.
Mr. Banks: I could not.
Prosecutor: What I'm asking you is this: If you believe he's guilty of both offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt, you are convinced that in your mind, he's guilty,
would you automatically refuse to consider a punishment of up to forty years as
possible punishment? Would you just refuse to consider it?
Mr. Banks: I couldn't give forty years.
Prosecutor: Regardless of the facts and circumstances, you could not consider-
even consider that?
Mr. Banks: Not forty years.
Prosecutor: Regardless of what the facts were?
Mr. Banks: No.
Prosecutor: Is that your answer?
Mr. Banks: That's my answer.
Id. at 689-90, 694-95, 606 S.W.2d at 564-65, 567.
5. Id. at 686, 606 S.W.2d 563.
6. Id.
7. The other grounds urged for reversal were: (a) the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the verdict; (b) the court erred in failing to read ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS CRIMINAL 203 [hereinafter AMI CRIMINAL] to the jury immediately following
reference to a former felony conviction; and, (c) AMI CRIMINAL 301 as given was improper.
Id.
8. 270 Ark. at 686, 693, 606 S.W.2d at 563, 566.
9. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: L The English Practice, 16 GEO. L.J. 438,
445, 453 n.53 (1928).
10. Id.
that in selecting a jury in the English courts, the challenge of a juror
is almost as rare as the challenge of a judge in the United States.I
Although the English rule was followed in this country, ' 2 it became
the prevailing view here, through legislative and judicial action, that
a party could examine prospective jurors to decide whether to use
peremptory or cause challenges.' 3
The purpose of voir dire has generally been twofold: to dis-
cover bases to challenge for cause and to gain information which
would enable an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. '4 In-
deed, the rationale for jury challenges rests upon the assumption
that certain types of individuals will be, consciously or uncon-
sciously, more sympathetic to one side than the other.'" Addition-
ally, it has always been assumed that the scope of the questioning
was within the sound discretion of the trial court. 16
Although much has been written concerning the history of jury
selection in this country, there are few cases and little commentary
regarding the permissible limits of voir dire inquiry into a prospec-
tive juror's willingness or unwillingness to assess a maximum pen-
alty, particularly in noncapital cases. Before 1968, the law regarding
capital cases was expressed in the rule of Logan v. United States:7
As the defendants were indicted and to be tried for a crime pun-
ishable with death, those jurors who stated on voir dire that they
had "conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the
death penalty for crime" were rightly permitted to be challenged
by the government for cause. A juror who has conscientious
scruples on any subject, which prevent him from standing indif-
ferent between the government and the accused, and from trying
the case according to the law and the evidence, is not an impar-
tial juror.II
It was also settled that a state could not entrust the determination of
whether a man was innocent or guilty to a tribunal "organized to
convict."' 19
11. Id.
12. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
292 (1952).
13. Eg., State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 258, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).
14. F. WOLESLAGEL, JURY 189 (1975).
15. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 15 (1979).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-226 (1962). See Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 316, 556
S.W.2d 434, 436 (1977) and cases cited therein.
17. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
18. Id. at 298.
19. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947).
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Initially Arkansas law was in line with the Logan rule in capital
cases. Bell v. State20 expressed the rule thus: "[T]he State, in the
trial of cases where the death penalty may be imposed, is entitled to
a jury that has no conscientious scruples as to such penalty."21
In Witherspoon v. Illinois22 the United States Supreme Court
modified the long-standing Logan rule by narrowing somewhat the
state's ability to exclude from the jury those veniremen who disliked
the death penalty.23 The Court held that the state could not exclude
those who merely voiced conscientious scruples against the death
penalty;24 it could exclude only those who were irrevocably commit-
ted before the trial began to voting against it regardless of the facts
and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceed-
ings.25 The Court reasoned that one who merely has general objec-
tions to, or conscientious scruples against, the death penalty could
nonetheless "make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by
the State and thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. ' 26  Since
Witherspoon the Court has consistently reaffirmed its position and
has on numerous occasions halted the execution of a death penalty
given by a jury from which all who had "scruples" against the death
penalty had been systematically excluded.27
20. 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915).
21. Id. at 543, 180 S.W. at 192. See also Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S.W.2d
785 (1949); Rogers v. State, 136 Ark. 161, 206 S.W. 152 (1918); Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145,
78 S.W. 773 (1904); Jones v. State, 58 Ark. 390, 397, 24 S.W. 1073, 1075 (1894): Atkins v.
State, 16 Ark. 568, 580 (1855).
22. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
23. Witherspoon was convicted and sentenced to death by a jury from which the prose-
cution had eliminated nearly half (47) of the venire by challenging, under the authority of a
Illinois statute, any venireman who had conscientious scruples against capital punishment.
Of the 47 excluded, only five explicitly stated that under no circumstances would they vote
to impose capital punishment. Six said they did not "believe in the death penalty" and were
excused without any attempt to determine whether they could nonetheless return a verdict of
death. Thirty-nine veniremen, including four of the six who indicated that they did not
believe in capital punishment, acknowledged having "conscientious or religious scruples"
against the infliction of the death penalty and were excluded without any effort to determine
if their scruples would invariably compel them to vote against the death penalty. Only one
was examined at any length. Id. at 514-15.
24. Id. at 522.
25. Id. at 522 n.21.
26. Id. at 519.
27. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (reversing a conviction and death penalty
imposed in a bifurcated trial from which a number of veniremen who stated that they were
unable to take an oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not
"'affect their deliberations on any issue of fact."); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976)
(reversing a conviction and death penalty which had been affirmed by the Georgia Supreme
Court even though it noted that one prospective juror had been excluded in violation of the
Witherspoon standard); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (remanded to consider in
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Arkansas law follows the Wiherspoon doctrine. Statutorily,
voir dire is specifically allowed by section 39-226 of the Arkansas
Statutes Annotated28 and rule 32.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.29 A challenge for implied bias may be made when
the offense is punishable by death and the prospective juror enter-
tains such conscientious opinions as would preclude his finding the
defendant guilty.30 The extent and scope of voir dire is largely a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the latitude
of the discretion is rather wide.3' Since the Witherspoon decision,
the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that it is not error in a capital
case for the trial court to excuse those veniremen whose answers
during voir dire indicate that they are unequivocally opposed to as-
sessing the death penalty; that is, regardless of the facts they would
not consider imposing it.32
light of Witherspoon, a death sentence imposed by a jury from which one venireman was
removed after stating that conscientious scruples might prevent his voting for a guilty ver-
dict, one was removed after stating he had conscientious scruples against the death penalty
and another was removed after stating he did not believe in capital punishment); Boulden v.
Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) (remanded to consider in light of Witherspoon, a death sen-
tence imposed by a jury from which eleven veniremen were excused on the basis of asserting
a "fixed opinion against" capital punishment and two were excluded because they did not
"believe in" capital punishment); accord, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (affirming a
conviction and death penalty imposed by a jury from which four veniremen were excluded
after careful questioning by the trial judge during which each stated that his or her feelings
against the death penalty would prevent him from taking an oath to "well and truly try the
case and follow the law").
28. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-226 (1962) provides: "In all cases, both civil and criminal,
the court shall examine all prospecutive jurors under oath upon all matters set forth in the
statutes as disqualifications. Further questions may be asked by the court, or by the attor-
neys in the case, in the discretion of the court."
29. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 32.2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Voir dire examination shall be conducted for the purpose of discovering bases
for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable the
parties to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. The judge shall initiate the
voir dire examination ....
(b) The judge shall then put to the prospective jurors any questions which he thinks
necessary touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The
judge shall also permit such additional questions by the defendant or his attorney
and the prosecuting attorney as the judge deems reasonable and proper.
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1920 (1977) provides in pertinent part: "A challenge for
implied bias may be taken. . . When the offense is punishable with death, the entertaining
of such conscientious opinions as would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty."
31. See note 16 supra.
32. See Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 599 S.W.2d 729 (1980); Swindler v. State, 267
Ark. 418, 592 S.W.2d 91 (1979); McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 465, 585 S.W.2d 938 (1979); Ruiz
v. State, 265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (1979); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 573 S.W.2d 622
(1978); Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W.2d 479, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977); Neal
v. State, 259 Ark. 27, 531 S.W.2d 17 (1975), vacated inpart, 429 U.S. 966 (1976), on remand,
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While Witherspoon changed the permissible limits of voir dire
in a capital case, the practice of excluding jurors who stated that
they could not deliver the maximum penalty in noncapital cases re-
mained. Prior to 1980 the Arkansas Supreme Court had not com-
mented on the problem in a noncapital context. The United States
Supreme Court, however, had considered the issue. In a footnote in
Witherspoon the Court said: "Nor does the decision in this case af-
fect the validity of any sentence other than one of death."33 Addi-
tionally, the same day on which the Supreme Court handed down
Witherspoon, it decided Bumper v. North Carolina34 in which the
constitutionality of a verdict returned by a jury selected in preciselythe same manner as the Witherspoon jury3 was upheld because the
jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death.
Haynes v. State36 is a case of first impression in Arkansas and
the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the questions asked by
the prosecutor during the voir dire were designed to select a jury
panel which would agree, before hearing the evidence, to assess the
maximum penalty if the appellant were found guilty.37 In arriving
at its conclusion, the court emphasized the prosecutor's statement
which informed the veniremen of the maximum penalties which
could be imposed for the offenses charged 38 and the state's intention
to seek that maximum.39 The court also quoted parts of the interro-
gation of Mrs. Collins, a prospective juror who was challenged for
cause by the state,4° and concluded that the jury was composed of
twelve people who may have felt obligated to impose the maximum
forty year penalty.
The defendant contended that the Witherspoon doctrine was
controlling. 4' The majority disagreed stating that the Witherspoon
doctrine did not apply because the question there related only to the
261 Ark. 336, 548 S.W.2d 135, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); O'Neal v. State, 253 Ark.
574, 487 S.W.2d 618 (1972); Montgomery v. State, 251 Ark. 645, 473 S.W.2d 885 (1971);
Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d 244, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 954 (1969).
33. 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968) (Court's emphasis).
34. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
35. Id. at 545. The prosecution was permitted to challenge for cause all prospective
jurors who stated that they were opposed to capital punishment or had conscientious
scruples against imposing the death penalty.
36. 270 Ark. 685, 606 S.W.2d 563 (1980).
37. Id. at 688, 606 S.W.2d at 564.
38. Id. at 688-89, 606 S.W.2d at 564. See note 3 supra.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 689-90, 606 S.W.2d at 564-65. See note 4 supra.
41. Id. at 691, 606 S.W.2d at 565.
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penalty of death.42 The court distinguished Haynes from a death
penalty case stating that one juror irrevocably opposed to the death
sentence regardless of the facts could effectively prevent its imple-
mentation.43 Because of this possibility, the court reasoned that it is
proper in a death penalty case to determine if prospective jurors are
irrevocably opposed to the maximum sentence. Additionally, capi-
tal punishment is a deeply emotional and, for some people, religious
issue-a factor missing in noncapital cases.44 The majority further
reasoned that allowing the state to challenge for cause those venire-
men who feel the maximum sentence is too long results in a jury
which is not impartial and thus destroys the purpose of the jury.45
Finally, the court noted the probable burden which would be
placed upon the trial process in terms of the time and expense re-
quired by prosecutors who would feel duty bound to disqualify ju-
rors who are reluctant to impose the maximum penalty.46 The court
predicted that the result would be endless bickering over unanswer-
able questions with hundreds of prospective veniremen needed to
find twelve jurors who will be willing to promise in advance of trial
to impose the maximum penalty.47
The dissenters,48 on the other hand, did not think that the
state's interrogation of the veniremen was an attempt to empanel a
jury precommitted to inflicting the maximum penalty upon a finding
of guilt. Rather, the prosecutor was attempting to seat a jury which
"could, if it so determined, award the maximum punishment. 4
9
Further, the dissenters found that the two excluded veniremen were
in fact unequivocally opposed to the maximum punishment.50
The dissent reasoned that it is the prosecutor's duty to present
the state's case in the best possible light5" and that there are cases in
which he would be derelict in his duty if he did not seek the maxi-
mum penalty. The dissent found no evidence to support the notion
that a jury selected in this manner would be predisposed to auto-
42. The court also stated that it did adhere to the Witherspoon principle that both the
state and the accused are entitled to an impartial and unbiased jury. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 690, 606 S.W.2d at 565.
46. Id. at 692, 606 S.W.2d at 566.
47. Id.
48. Chief Justice Fogleman and Justice Hickman.
49. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 696, 606 S.W.2d 563, 568 (1980) (emphasis in the
original).
50. See note 4 supra.
51. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 696, 606 S.W.2d 563, 568 (1980).
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matically assess the maximum penalty if it found the defendant
guilty.5 2 Furthermore, the dissent viewed the majority decision as a
denial of the state's right to an impartial and unbiased jury-one
which had not already decided, before trial, that a lawful sentence
would not be imposed regardless of the circumstances. 3
Although the Haynes court denied that Witherspoon was con-
trolling, the essence of its holding is to extend the Witherspoon doc-
trine to noncapital cases. Haynes gives to noncapital defendants in
Arkansas the same protection with regard to jury selection that
Witherspoon gave to capital defendants; that is, the right not to have
excluded from the jury those veniremen who have mere scruples
against the maximum sentence. Compare the similarity of the lan-
guage used by Justice Purtle in Haynes:
[T]he most that may be required of a juror, before the trial has
begun, is that he be willing to consider all the penalties provided
by law and that he not be irrevocably committed to vote against
the possible penalties, regardless of the facts and circumstances
that might ensue in the course of trial,54
with the language used by Justice Stewart in Witherspoon:
[T]he most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is
that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state
law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial
has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the
facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings."
A careful reading of the voir dire set out in both the majority
and dissenting opinions of Haynes reveals that both jurors who were
eventually excused for cause did indicate that they thought the max-
imum penalty of forty years was too much regardless of the circum-
stances.56 The majority and the dissent seem to disagree only on
what constituted being "irrevocably committed" to voting against
the maximum penalty. The consequences for the state seem to be
similar to those which resulted from the Witherspoon decision.5 7
Prosecutors will have to question prospective jurors more exten-
sively than in the past to determine the exact degree of opposition
52. Id.
53. Id. at 697, 606 S.W.2d at 568.
54. Id. at 693, 606 S.W.2d at 566.
55. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
56. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 689-90, 694-95, 606 S.W.2d 563, 564-65, 567 (1980).
57. See Note, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 129 (1968), and Recent Decisions, 3 GA. L. REv.
234, 241 (1968).
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which a prospective juror has toward the maximum punishment.
Clearly, after Haynes, prosecutors may not ask prospective jurors if
they would render the maximum penalty if the state proves the de-
fendant's guilt.58
Jurors who express hostile feelings to a given maximum penalty
will no longer be summarily dismissed for cause. In their attempt to
ensure that the state has a jury which could assess the maximum
penalty, prosecutors will be forced to convince the trial judge that a
given juror's voir dire answers indicate feelings strong enough to
amount to an irrevocable commitment to vote against it. The ques-
tioning of veniremen could become more extensive as prosecutors
try to establish the requisite irrevocable commitment in order to
strike those jurors whom they feel could not assess the maximum
penalty. The result of this extensive questioning may be a trial pro-
cess greatly burdened and expanded with appeals becoming com-
monplace. Ironically, this is exactly what Justice Purtle feared
would be the result if the state were allowed to strike for cause those
veniremen who had mere reservations about imposing the maxi-
mum penalty.59
Some alternatives are apparent. Prosecutors can use peremp-
tory challenges to avoid the rule, but those challenges are limited in
number.6° One legislative solution to the problem is taking the job
of sentencing from the jury and requiring the judge to set penalties.
This, however, would not completely eliminate the questioning
about sentencing during voir dire since it is conceivable that knowl-
edge of the maximum penalty could influence a juror's willingness
to find guilt. Another legislative solution is mandatory sentencing.
This solution, however, also carries with it the possibility that a ju-
ror's knowledge of the required punishment could inhibit him from
voting for a verdict of guilty. The state's voir dire questioning
would thus still be aimed at determining which veniremen are irrev-
ocably opposed to the maximum available penalty.
The likely result of Haynes is that trial judges will require a
58. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 690, 606 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1980), wherein the prose-
cutor is quoted as asking, "[W]ould you be able to consider as the only possible punishment,
would you be able to impose a sentence of up to forty years in the Department of Correc-
tions if the facts warranted it?"
59. Id. at 692, 606 S.W.2d at 566.
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1921 (1977) provides: 'The State shall be entitled to ten [10]
peremptory challenges in prosecutions for offenses punishable by death or life imprison-
ment, to six [61 peremptory challenges in all other prosecutions for felony and to three [31
peremptory challenges in (the) prosecutions for misdemeanor[s].
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more definite showing that a prospective juror is irrevocably com-
mitted to voting against the maximum penalty regardless of the facts
of the case before allowing the state to excuse the juror for cause.
This may result in more defense-oriented juries-at least until pros-
ecutors learn how to characterize a juror's feelings against imposing
the maximum penalty as an irrevocable commitment against impos-
ing it.
Marcella Taylor
